When Central Bank of Ireland Governor Gabriel Makhlouf stepped to the podium in Dublin on 13 November 2026 to deliver opening remarks at a joint academic and policy workshop, the question framed in the event's very title encapsulated one of the most consequential debates in contemporary economic governance: is the resurgence of industrial policy a dangerous return to the statist failures of the past, or does it represent a genuinely reformed and legitimate tool of modern economic management?

The workshop, co-hosted by the Central Bank of Ireland alongside the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and University College Dublin (UCD), brought together economists, policymakers and researchers to interrogate precisely that tension. That a central bank chose not merely to attend but to co-host and open such a forum is itself a signal worth noting — one that reflects the degree to which industrial policy has migrated from the margins of respectable economic discourse to the centre of institutional debate.

For much of the post-Cold War era, industrial policy carried the stigma of its own history. Governments that had attempted to pick winners through targeted subsidies, protected domestic industries or state-directed investment found themselves routinely cited in economics curricula as cautionary tales. The Washington Consensus, the liberalisation wave of the 1990s, and the ascendancy of market-efficiency doctrine collectively buried active state intervention in productive sectors beneath decades of intellectual disapproval. Central bankers, in particular, were expected to remain at a studied distance from such questions — their remit defined by price stability, financial system integrity and, in some jurisdictions, employment mandates, but emphatically not by which sectors an economy should cultivate.

What has changed is the weight of converging structural pressures that now demand a response. The energy transition requires capital deployment at a speed and scale that markets alone have not demonstrated an ability to coordinate. Supply-chain fragility — exposed with painful clarity during the pandemic and again through geopolitical disruptions — has revived arguments for strategic domestic capacity in semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and critical minerals. The accelerating development of artificial intelligence has introduced new questions about where high-value economic activity will concentrate and whether governments can shape that geography. These are not fringe anxieties; they are the stated concerns of finance ministries and central banks across the developed world.

Governor Makhlouf's decision to open the Dublin workshop positions the Central Bank of Ireland as an institution willing to engage seriously with these questions rather than deferring them entirely to elected governments and their economic advisers. That posture matters, particularly for a small, highly open economy like Ireland's, whose fiscal and economic identity has been shaped profoundly by foreign direct investment, multinational technology and pharmaceutical clusters, and a tax framework that attracted global capital over decades. Any serious national industrial policy debate in Ireland must contend with that inheritance — and with the question of how domestic productive capacity can be deepened without disrupting the investment environment that underpins so much of the country's output.

The "redux or renewal" framing is analytically useful because it refuses to treat the return of industrial policy language as automatically benign. Redux implies repetition — the recycling of interventionist habits that generated dependency, inefficiency and fiscal overextension in earlier eras. Renewal implies something more demanding: that policymakers have genuinely absorbed the lessons of past failures, designed institutional guardrails against capture and waste, and are applying state capacity in areas where market failures are demonstrable rather than merely asserted. The distinction is not semantic. Governments around the world are currently committing very large sums — through vehicles such as the United States Inflation Reduction Act, the European Union's Green Deal Industrial Plan and various national sovereign funds — and the quality of that commitment varies enormously.

For central banks and financial regulators, the industrial policy revival carries specific implications beyond the academic. Directed credit, state guarantees and large-scale public investment programmes all interact with financial stability, sovereign debt dynamics and monetary transmission. A central bank that ignores those interactions on jurisdictional grounds may find itself managing the consequences of policy decisions it had no hand in shaping. Makhlouf's willingness to convene and engage this debate, alongside CEPR and UCD, suggests an institution alert to that risk.

What This Means for Policymakers and Markets

The Dublin forum represents something more than a one-day academic exercise. It is an indicator of how economic institutions in smaller open economies are repositioning themselves for a world in which the boundary between monetary policy, financial stability and industrial strategy is becoming harder to maintain. For market participants, the signal is that central banks — including the Central Bank of Ireland — are no longer content to treat industrial policy as exclusively someone else's domain. For policymakers, the challenge issued by Makhlouf's framing is direct: if you are going to revive the instruments of state economic intervention, you must demonstrate that this is renewal grounded in evidence, not redux dressed in modern vocabulary.

Written by the editorial team — independent journalism powered by Codego Press.